Abstract The paper considers the case for an internationally coordinated further fiscal stimulus during the second half of 2009. Although this makes some of the analysis period-specific, most of the issues and principles considered are timeless. For a fiscal stimulus to be both effective there must be idle resources due to a failure of effective demand. For it to be desirable, there must be no alternative policy instruments (including monetary policy) for boosting demand. There must be no complete financial crowding out and no complete direct crowding out, through Ricardian equivalence/debt neutrality, through Minsky equivalence or through a high degree of substitutability between private and public exhaustive expenditure in private preferences or production possibilities. Finally, for international coordination to be desirable, there must be cross-border externalities from national fiscal stimuli. The paper considers each of these conditions in turn.
I. Introduction
Is there a case for a further internationally coordinated expansionary fiscal stimulus? T warranted, a number of conditions must be satisfied.
First, there must be idle resources -involuntary unemployment of labour and unwan excess capacity. Output and employment must be effectively demand-constrained. Sec there must be no more effective way of stimulating demand, say through expansion monetary policy. Third, expansionary fiscal policy must not drive up interest rates, eith raising the risk-free real interest rate or by raising the sovereign default risk premium, to an extent that the fiscal stimulus is emasculated through financial crowding out. Fourt given interest rates, the expansionary fiscal policy measures must not be neutralized by dir crowding out (the displacement of private spending by public spending or of public dissa by private saving at given present and future interest rates, prices, and activity levels). direct crowding out can occur in the case of tax cuts (strictly speaking, cuts in lump-sum t matched by future increases in lump-sum taxes of equal present discounted value) because of Ricardian equivalence/debt neutrality. In economies with very highly indebted households, debt neutrality can occur when taxes on households are cut, because of what I shall call 'Minsky equivalence' (see Minsky, 2008) . Increases in public spending on real goods and services ('exhaustive' public spending) can fail to boost aggregate demand because of a high degree of substitutability (in the utility functions or the production technology) between private consumption and investment on the one hand, and public consumption and investment on the other. Fifth, there must be cross-border externalities from expansionary fiscal policies that cause decentralized, uncoordinated national fiscal expansions to be suboptimal. This paper considers these issues in tum. The conclusions on the scope for further conven tional expansionary fiscal policy now are rather discouraging in nations with high and rapidly rising public debt burdens, unless there is scope for political realignments that support coali tions in favour of significant future fiscal tightening through tax increases or public spending cuts. I also outline some unconventional fiscal/financial policies that may be effective in their own right and may help to enhance the effectiveness of conventional expansionary fiscal pol icy. Collectively, they can be characterized as the equitization of debt-household mortgage debt, bank debt, and public debt.
II. Idle resources
The first of these conditions, the existence of idle resources reflecting deficient effective de mand, is clearly satisfied in the advanced industrial countries: at the time of writing (November 2009), unemployment throughout the industrial world is high and rising. Capital utilization rates are low and falling. Figure I summarizes the state of the G7 economies, indicating high and rising spare capacity; even though GDP is now growing again almost everywhere, it is growing more slowly than potential output, so unemployment will be rising in much of the industrial world for the rest of this year and much of 20 I 0. In some countries, including the UK and USA, unemployment could still be rising in 2011.
The picture is rather better, although subject to considerable country-specific variation, among the emerging markets and developing countries, however. In the aggregate, emerging markets and developing countries now account for around 50 per cent of global GDP and trade. China's growth rate is reported to be well above 9 per cent again, at an annual rate, and India is growing fast and never even experienced much of a slowdown. Brazil is recovering briskly from a sharp decline in industrial production at the end of 2008. Other emerging markets and developing countries, such as Indonesia, also appear to have experienced only minor growth pauses. Individually none of these countries, not even China, is large enough to act as a global locomotive. Collectively, however, they are a powerful force for global recovery.
The strength of the emerging markets is, not uniform, however. Even among the BRICs,
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Russia demonstrates, with a more than IO per cent year-on-year decline in GDP, the vulner ability of some emerging markets to the interruption of global financial intermediation, the 
III. Monetary policy
As regards ways other than fiscal policy to boost demand, monetary policy in the advanced industrial countries appears to have been pushed about as far as is possible, unless governments undertake the (minor) institutional and technical reforms to permit them to set short nominal policy rates at negative values (see Buiter, 2009) as easily as at positive values. There appears to be no policy-maker interest in pursuing the possibility of extending the domain of the official policy rate to include negative numbers. Exchange-rate changes (deliberate devaluations/revaluations in managed exchange-rate regimes or endogenous responses to policy actions or other exogenous shocks) are globally zero-sum as regards their effect on demand -they redistribute demand between currency areas. This does not necessarily mean that exchange-rate changes cannot be welcomed by all parties involved, but this will only be the case if the country with the depreciating currency has deficient aggregate demand, while the country experiencing currency appreciation has excess demand. Even more welcome would be the configuration of the country with the depreciating currency experiencing both deficient aggregate demand and an excessive trade deficit, while One common argument against a zero Federal Funds target rate and a negative rate on excess commercial bank deposits held with the central bank is that this would create a material risk of money-market funds 'breaking the buck', that is, of its net asset value falling below US$1 a share.4 It is time for the regulators to educate the investing public that there is nothing anomalous about money-market funds breaking the buck occasionally. Indeed, it is to be expected that the buck will be broken from time to time, if money-market funds offer higher expected returns than deposit accounts -as they do. Unlike retail deposit accounts (federally insured up to US$250,000 through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), money-market funds have not been federally insured, except during a 1 -year interval following the failure of Lehman Brothers (between 18 September 2008 and 18 September 2009) when they were guaranteed by the US Treasury.
When challenged on their failure to lower the official policy rate to its lowest possible level (zero minus the carry cost of currency), the authorities tend to proffer technical, operational reasons for why a zero official policy rate would be awkward/difficult/impossible to implement. With the official policy rate at zero (assuming for concreteness that the official policy 3 Since 8 July 2009 Sweden's Riksbank has its official policy rate, the repo rate, at 0.25 per cent and the deposit rate at -0.25 per cent.
4 US money-market funds are mutual funds that used to invest only in short-term, generally risk-free, liquid assets. They were structured to ensure that the net asset value per share would not fall below US$1. During the period before the crisis, these funds did, however, invest in securities that turned out to be very risky, such as credit default swaps (CDS) written by Lehman Brothers. Like all debt, public debt is both a potentially useful and a potentially dangerous social invention. Like financial instruments in general, it permits individuals and groups of individuals, including nations, to smooth consumption over time -it permits saving to be de-coupled from investment. In what follows it will be important not to use the word 'debt' as equivalent to 'financial instrument' or 'financial claim'. Equity and other profit-, loss-and risk-sharing instruments also permit the de-coupling of saving and investment and the smoothing of consumption over time, over the life cycle, and across generations. When I refer to debt, it is narrowly defined as a financial instrument imposing fixed, non-contingent payment obligations on the borrower. Borrowing in this narrow sense creates a legal obligation to repay the debt with interest at some future date. Failure to meet the fixed debt commitments results in the triggering of default provisions that often impose significant costs on the issuer of the debt. Much of these costs is social rather than just redistributive between debtor and creditor: real resources are expended in the resolution of a debt default.
Because the net financial benefit from adhering to the terms of a debt contract sooner or later become negative for the borrower, and because the desire for future access to borrowing facilities and a concern for one's reputation are often imperfect contract enforcement mechanisms, self-enforcing debt contracts are rare in the private sphere and third-party or external contract enforcement tend to be the rule. This is less true for sovereign borrowing. External or third-party enforcement of sovereign debt contracts is unusual, although countries can at times be forced or bullied by other nations to meet some of their external obligations. The British and Dutch authorities, for instance, forced the Icelandic government to recognize the deposit insurance obligations of 'Icesave', one of the foreign branches of the Icelandic bank Landsbanki (which became insolvent in October 2008), despite there not being any clear legal or treaty-based grounds for the Icelandic sovereign to assume these bank liabilities as its own. Self-enforcement is, however, the rule for sovereign debt contracts. Repetition and reputation can sustain debt service that would not be individually rational in a one-shot or single-stage game. Most of the time, governments honour the sovereign debt bequeathed to them by their predecessors, even if the new government disapproves of the spending programmes or tax cuts that generated that debt. It is also helpful to define the ma share of GDP) that the government government is the difference betwe ratio the government can extract an ratio required for government solven
Fiscal Spare Capacity = šMax -šR. (6) The highest future tax burden the government will be able to impose, and the m public spending levels it will be able to get away with, are determined by a host of e political, and social factors. Nations where the polity is highly polarized may not b This discussion suggests a fiscal policy design lesson, which I shall formulate as a proposition.
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Proposition 1 : Cooperatively design ing to the fiscal spare capacity ' of (and to commit itself credibly to surpluses.
The fact that, from equation (4) Even operationally independent central banks must recognize that their profits and their monetary issuance are a potentially important source of revenue/means of financing for the state, especially during periods of extraordinarily high liquidity preference, that is, during financial crises. This is true regardless of whether the official monetary policy rate is at its zero floor or above it. Quantitative easing (expansion of the monetary base through purchases of government securities) is an especially important source of revenue for the sovereign whenever the central bank's official policy rate (strictly speaking, the rates on base money; that is, the zero rate on currency and the rate paid on commercial bank deposits with the central bank) are well below the interest rate on long-term Treasury debt.
Close cooperation between the monetary and fiscal authorities is necessary to achieve the right timing and magnitude both of monetization of public debt and deficits, and of the reversal of this monetization when the economy recovers. When done competently, these cooperative and coordinated actions will not threaten the medium-and long-term price stability mandate of the central bank.
The financial crisis threatens government solvency through what amounts to an increase in the stock of net debt, d. This can take the form of guarantees for and insurance of bank assets or liabilities, injections of capital financed through government debt issuance, etc.
Much of the exposure is contingent and technically off balance sheet for the state. From the perspective of fiscal sustainability, however, all these contingent liabilities should be priced (e.g. using real option pricing methods) and added to d' the fair value, that is, either the marked-to-market value or marked-to-model value of any (contingent) assets the government may have acquired as part of its banking sector or financial sector bail-out operations, should be subtracted from d.
Governments have wasted a fair amount of resources by guaranteeing, ex post , existing loans and investments that had already gone bad. This is bad economics: greater bang-perbuck in terms of new lending and, provided the guarantee is properly priced, lower moral hazard result from operating at the margin by providing guarantees for new lending rather than inframarginally, by guaranteeing existing loans.
Proposition 3: If the state provides guarantees to banks, it should guarantee new lending, not existing debt.
V. When does a fiscal stimulus boost aggregate demand?
A fiscal stimulus is a key weapon in the policy arsenal used to address an undesirable weakening of aggregate demand. For the policy to make sense, either an increase in public Even if financial markets were perfect, life-cycle theories of consumption would imply that postponing taxes by government borrowing (that is, cutting (lump-sum) taxes today and raising them by the same amount in present discounted value at some later date) boosts aggregate consumption demand because it redistributes resources from people with longer expected remaining life-spans (the young and the unborn) to people with shorter expected remaining life-spans (the old and those currently alive). Strictly speaking, this requires that the tax cuts (transfer payments) be labour-income tax cuts, or lump-sum tax cuts, or transfer payments accruing to persons (owners of human wealth -the non-tradable present discounted value of future after-tax labour income), rather than tax cuts on the returns to or on the value of non-human, financial, and real assets that are owned fully by those currently alive.
Life-cycle principles imply that, because people try to smooth consumption over the lifecycle, the old will have a higher marginal propensity to consume out of current income windfalls than the young. Prior to conception, the unborn, of course, do not consume at all.
To negate these life-cycle arguments for an expansionary demand effect from tax cuts, the Ricardian equivalence or debt neutrality school assumes (i) that the government always satisfies its intertemporal budget constraint (there is no default risk on public debt) and (ii) that aggregate consumption can be viewed as the consumption of a single, representative infinite-lived consumer. The awkward fact that people are born, live, and die is finessed by assuming that everyone is linked to all past and future generations through an unbroken chain of operative intergenerational bequest motives.
Stating the assumptions required for Ricardian equivalence to hold is to deny its relevance. Postponing taxes through borrowing, without changing their present discounted value, will boost aggregate demand because it redistributes resources from the young to the old, from the unborn to those currently alive, and from permanent-income or life-cycle households to Keynesian households -households constrained by liquidity and current disposable income. The only exception, discussed below, is when households are highly indebted and extremely risk-averse, cautious, and prudent.
A key point to note is that these aggregate-demand-boosting redistributions can also be achieved without the need for public-sector deficits if there is a sufficiently rich set of tax-transfer instruments (see Buiter and Kietzer, 1998 ). If we can identify the young and the old, the life-cycle consumers, and the Keynesian consumers, and if we have a sufficiently rich arsenal of taxes and transfers, we can do balanced-budget redistributions that will boost aggregate consumption. In addition, a balanced-budget increase in public spending on real goods and services (exhaustive public spending) will boost demand unless households are ultra-Keynesian, with a marginal propensity to consume out of current disposable income of 1.
Proposition 4: Balanced-budget redistribution between households with different marginal propensities to spend out of current income can boost demand as effectively as deficit-financed tax cuts. Examples include the following:
I. an increase in social security retirement pensions financed fully by higher social security contributions by workers; 2. an increase in student grants financed fully through a levy on financial assets (students with rising age-earnings profiles are likely to be liquidity-constrained, unlike owners of financial assets);
an increase in short-term unemployment benefit financed by a reduction in long-term unemployment benefit (short-term and temporarily unemployed workers are more likely to be liquidity-constrained).
The consumer-oriented tax cuts and transfer payment increases recommended in the IMF Staff Position Note, 'Fiscal Policy for the Crisis' (Spilimergo et al., 2008) overlap mostly with what I recommend here (increased unemployment benefits, increases in earned income tax credits, and the expansion of safety nets in countries where such nets are limited ( e.g. China)). Most of these examples of balanced-budget fiscal measures with an expansionary effect, whether they work through the tax-transfer side of the budget or consist of tax-financed increases in exhaustive public spending, involve redistribution from the richer to the poorer. Distributional politics often takes precedence over macroeconomic stabilization logic.
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Increased public spending on goods and services Even if there is Ricardian equivalence for tax cuts or increases in transfer payments, a temporary increase in public spending on currently produced goods and services ( exhaustive public spending) will stimulate demand. The reason is that a I-year (say) increase in public consumption or investment of $1 billion will, reduce permanent income by much less than $1 billion-to a reasonable approximation, private consumption would only fall by an amount given by the product of the time preference rate and $1 billion-maybe by $30m or so. In the Ricardian view, a permanent increase in exhaustive public spending would not boost aggregate demand, as it would lower permanent income and thus private consumption by the same amount as the permanent increase in public spending.
If the Keynesian consumption function with its liquidity-constrained consumers describes reality, a balanced-budget increase in public consumption or investment spending (funded with higher taxes or lower transfer payments) would boost aggregate demand. Interest-rate crowding out will be full or 1 00 per cent in a closed economy when the nominal money stock is kept constant and velocity is constant -the vertical LM curve case. In the Even when the monetary authorities peg the short nominal interest rate, there will be full crowding out of an (unanticipated, immediate, permanent) fiscal expansion under perfect international capital mobility when the exchange rate floats and the world interest rate is given. A smaller trade surplus (larger trade deficit) undoes the effect of the fiscal stimulus on output through an appreciation of the nominal and real exchange rates.
A large country or region (such as the USA or the Eurozone) with a floating exchange rate could use domestic expansionary fiscal policy to raise domestic demand to the extent that its actions raise the world real and nominal interest rate, but even for a large country or region, a significant part of a domestic fiscal stimulus may end up boosting output abroad through larger imports and reduced exports. At given world rates of interest, the entire demand stimulus leaks abroad through a larger trade deficit. When output and employment are demand-constrained, these international demand spillovers are not just pecuniary externalities, but can have firstorder welfare effects. If there are domestic costs to or constraints on expansionary fiscal policy, fiscal expansion will, like any positive externality, be under-supplied. This discussion has an obvious implication.
Proposition 6: International coordination of cooperatively designed fiscal stimuli is likely to be necessary to allow the internalization of the effective demand externalities of a fiscal stimulus through the trade balance and the real exchange rate. This case is likely to be strongest when the degree of international capital mobility is high and the exchange rate floats.
Real resource crowding out
Real resource crowding out occurs when, regardless of the degree of financial crowding out, real resource constraints (capital and labour bottlenecks) limit the expansion of output in response to a fiscal impulse. It will tend to be accompanied by rising prices and wages, often by rising real wages and by rising inflationary pressures. In an open economy, the domestic supply constraint on final demand can be relaxed through the trade balance. For the world as a whole this is not possible. Fiscal policy cannot relax physical supply-side constraints in the short run, unless one believes there are significant effects of changes in labour income tax rates and other non-lump-sum taxes on labour supply.
However, I argue in section VII that credit policy may reduce working capital constraints on production and employment, so credit-easing policies may relax effective (financial) supply constraints on output, thus permitting a fiscal stimulus to have a stronger expansionary effect.
Direct crowding out
The effect on aggregate demand of an increase in public spending on real goods and services depends not only on the way it is financed and on the marginal propensities to consume of current and future taxpayers. It also depends on whether the real resources consumed or If a tax cut or an increase in public spending is deficit-financed, and if markets doubt whether the government or its successors will raise future taxes (including monetary issuance) or cut future public spending by the same amount in present discounted value terms as the up-front tax cut or public spending increase, perceived default risk will increase and the government's cost of borrowing will rise. Government borrowing rates tend to set a floor for private-sector borrowing rates. Although it is possible that the private sector could borrow on better terms than its sovereign, such situations are few and far between.
A sufficiently large increase in the government deficit (or an increase in net public debt through any other mechanism) could therefore increase the default risk premium on the public debt to such an extent that the net effect of the tax, spending, and financing decisions on aggregate demand could become negative. Note that this has nothing to do with Ricardian Equivalence, which assumes that the government never defaults but instead always meets its intertemporal budget constraint. It is a form of financial crowding out, but not through increases in the risk-free rate, but through increases in the default risk premium.
Proposition 7: Financial crowding out is always and everywhere a (monetary) policy choice if the financial crowding out occurs through an increase in risk-free rates. Monetary accommodation may not be able to neutralize financial crowding out if rising interest rates are due to increases in sovereign default risk premia. For example , when the risk-free nominal interest rate is at the zero lower bound , monetary policy cannot neutralize an increase in default risk premia .
So far, in most of the industrial world and in the emerging markets, the increases in sovereign default risk premia have not been of sufficient magnitude to create worries about the effectiveness of expansionary, debt-financed fiscal policy through this default-risk driven financial crowding-out mechanisms. In most countries, including the USA, the UK, and Germany, the policy-induced decline in the short-term risk-free rate was at first sufficient to neutralize the increase in the default risk premia on (longer-term) sovereign debt and any effect of higher long-term inflation expectations on longer-term risk-free nominal rates. The cost of long-term government borrowing actually declined.
This situation began to reverse itself at the end of 2008, and both government default risk premia and long-term interest rates on sovereign debt rose for a couple of quarters. In a number of European countries (Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and some of the Central and Eastern European countries) sovereign default risk premia rose to the point that a higher The 'Austrian' or working capital supply-side model of the supply side was introduced into mainstream macroeconomic analysis by Alan Blinder (1987) , but it has not become part of the standard professional tool set (for a non-technical description, see Buiter (2008) ). I believe that the 'Great Credit Crunch of the Noughties' will demonstrate its usefulness, because of its key assumption that production cannot take place without credit. A severe contraction in economic activity induced by a credit crunch could, if effective supply contracts even faster than effective demand, lead to greater upward pressure on prices or inflation than would be inferred by considering the output gap defined not as the gap between effective demand and effective supply, but instead between effective demand and notional supply. Notional supply or potential output is determined by the available physical resources of capital, land, and labour and is independent, in the short run, of the cost and availability of credit.13
Proposition 8: Because production takes time , working capital is essential for effective supply ; even in the short run. Policies to provide credit to the non-financial enterprise sector 13 In the long run, the physical capital stock is endogenous and is therefore affected by the cost and availability of finance. Working capital can affect effective supply at much shorter horizons, of months or quarters. may therefore be a preconditi on production and employmen complementary to fiscal policy VIII. Neoclassical fiscal measures Keynesians believe in the power of (current) income effects on spending. N economists believe in the power of the intertemporal substitution effect. Why n when there is no additional price tag attached to the neoclassical effect?
A temporary VAT cut I believe the temporary VAT cut introduced in the UK by Chancellor Darling last y cent down now to 15 per cent, back up to 17.5 per cent after 13 months on 1 Jan and which was given such as hard time by many observers, made sense. In princip the intertemporal terms of trade like that causes consumers to switch their ex (especially on durables) to the temporarily low tax period. It so happened that the wars that were going on at the time may have drowned out these relative minor apart from that (and apart from the menu costs inflicted on restaurants and shopke was not a silly idea. Perhaps a cut to 10 per cent for a shorter period would have impact on behaviourist consumers, but the principle of using the substitution effe reinforces the income effect is surely sensible.
A temporary investment tax credit! subsidy Too little capital and excessive debt are limiting the ability and willingness of lend to households and to the non-financial private sector. Credit constraints on demand limit the effectiveness of fiscal policy. An obvious solution would be conversions of unsecured bank debt into equity (starting with the most junior working up the seniority ladder until the bank is once more adequately capita appropriate special resolution regime (SRR) for banks and other systemically i highly leveraged institutions with asset-liability mismatch as regards maturity a (and possibly currency denomination) could turn unsecured bank creditors into The rapid deterioration of the public finances in many countries (as measu public debt-to-GDP ratio and the public-sector structural primary deficit a presents a formidable obstacle to any additional use of fiscal stimuli to boos these fiscal measures would result in even larger deficits. There are a numbe these constraints. One is to have recourse to monetary financing. This can h authorities can make it credible that they have enough fiscal spare capacity quantitative easing in the future, when the output gap closes and the large inj bank liquidity would become inflationary. A second approach is to use balanced-budget fiscal measures, both Keyn classical, to boost demand.
The third is to shift the political equilibrium of the country to boost fisc If President Obama can shift the destructive, polarized US political equili Republicans veto all future tax increases and Democrats veto all future pub there could be room for an additional fiscal stimulus that would not spoo markets.
